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This paper presents a tractable model of a global economy in which coun-
tries can use a broad range of policy instruments—the nominal interest rate,
taxes on imports and exports, taxes on capital flows or foreign exchange in-
terventions. Low demand may lead to unemployment because of downward
nominal wage stickiness. Markov perfect equilibria with and without inter-
national cooperation are characterized in closed form. The welfare costs of
trade and currency wars crucially depend on the state of global demand and
on the policy instruments that are used by national policymakers. Coun-
tries have more incentives to deviate from free trade when global demand
is low. Trade wars lower employment if they involve tariffs on imports but
raise employment if they involve export subsidies. Tariff wars can lead to
self-fulfilling global liquidity traps.
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Countries have regularly accused each other of being aggressors in a currency war
since the global financial crisis. Guido Mantega, Brazil’s finance minister, in 2010
blamed the US for launching a currency war through quantitative easing leading
to a weaker dollar.1 At the time, Brazil itself was trying to hold its currency down
with a tax on capital inflows and by accumulating reserves. Many countries, in-
cluding advanced economies such as Switzerland, have resisted the appreciation
of their currency by resorting to foreign exchange interventions. The term “cur-
rency war” was again used when the Japanese yen depreciated in 2013 after the
Bank of Japan increased its inflation target as part of the Abenomics stimulus
(and more recently when it reduced the interest rate to a negative level). Bergsten
and Gagnon (2012) proposed that the US undertake countervailing currency inter-
vention against countries that manipulate their currencies, or tax the earnings on
the dollar assets of these countries. After 2016 the US administration justified the
introduction of tariffs by the fact that countries such as China were manipulating
their currencies.
The conventional wisdom in the official sector, echoed in Bernanke (2017) or
Blanchard (2017), is that depreciations should not raise concerns as long as they
are the by-product, rather than the main objective, of monetary stimulus. Other
authors, e.g., Mishra and Rajan (2018), find the international spillovers from mon-
etary and exchange rate policies less benign and advocate enhanced international
coordination to limit the effects of these spillovers.
The concepts of currency war and trade war are old but we do not have many
models to analyze these wars, separately or as concurrent phenomena. One fea-
ture of the real world that such a model should capture is the multiplicity of
policy instruments that are used achieve similar outcomes. A currency can be
depreciated by lowering the interest rate, by raising the inflation target, by tax-
ing capital inflows, or by accumulating foreign exchange reserves. The demand
for home goods can be increased by depreciating the home currency, by taxing
imports or by subsidizing exports. Presumably, the international spillovers and
the case for international cooperation should depend on the policy instruments.
Another desirable feature of a model is that it should not assume that countries
are committed to policy rules. Trade and currency wars seem to be deviations
from the policy rules that are applied in normal times.
1“We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a general weakening of currency.
This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.” as reported by Martin Wolf in
“Currencies Clash in New Age of Beggar-thy-Neighbor,” Financial Times September 28, 2010.
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In this paper I present a simple model with these features. I consider a symmet-
ric world with many countries, each one producing its own good like in Gali and
Monacelli (2005). There is downward nominal stickiness in wages like in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2016).2 This assumption implies that each country is either
in a classical regime with full employment and flexible wages or in a Keynesian
regime with unemployment and fixed wages. I assume that each country can use
four policy instruments: the nominal interest rate, a tax on capital flows, a tariff
on imports and a subsidy on exports. The tax on capital flows can be interpreted
as foreign exchange intervention. National policymakers can use all or a subset of
these instruments without being able to commit to any future policy action. In
particular, there is no Taylor rule and monetary policy is discretionary.
The main qualities that I look for in the model are tractability and analytical
clarity. I solve for the Markov perfect equilibria in which policymakers set policies
so as to maximize home welfare taking the global economic and financial conditions
as given. A first-order approximation allows me to derive easily interpretable
closed-form expressions for the equilibrium policies under different assumptions
about the available policy instruments. The equilibrium under international policy
cooperation is characterized by assuming that the policies of the representative
country are set by a global social planner maximizing global welfare. Although
very simple, the model can be used to quantify the welfare cost of currency and
trade wars.
The model results crucially depend on whether countries are in the classical
or Keynesian regime. In the classical regime, national policymakers use the trade
taxes to manipulate the terms of trade in their countries’ favor like in the textbook
tariff war. They can do so by imposing a tax on exports or a tariff on imports (the
two instruments are equivalent because of Lerner symmetry).
The analysis is very different if countries are in the Keynesian regime. Coun-
tries can be in the Keynesian regime with unemployment if the zero-lower-bound
constraint is binding, which tends to happen when global demand is low. In the
Keynesian regime with unemployment, increasing home welfare is in general equiv-
alent to increasing home employment. The objective of trade policy, thus, is to
raise home employment rather than the home terms of trade. To raise employment
a national policymaker must move the trade taxes in opposite directions, i.e., tax
imports or subsidize exports. National policymakers can also raise employment
2There is considerable evidence (reviewed by these authors among others) that wages are
more rigid downward than upward. The fact that wages were more rigid than prices during the
Great Depression is well documented (see, e.g., Eichengreen, 1992).
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by taxing capital inflows or accumulating foreign exchange reserves, which in both
cases depreciates the home currency. In general these policies are beggar-thy-
neighbor, in the sense that welfare can be increased in one’s country only at the
cost of lowering welfare in the rest of the world. However, the model shows that
this is not a sufficient reason for international cooperation. The case for interna-
tional cooperation depends on the policy instruments and on the state of global
demand in a nontrivial way.
First, there is no benefit from international coordination of interest rates or in-
flation targets. A monetary stimulus is beggar-thy-neighbor in partial equilibrium
but it is a positive sum game in general equilibrium. If there is unemployment, a
global monetary stimulus, if feasible, always raises global employment and welfare.
Second, the case for coordinating trade policies depends on the state of global
demand. It is of course optimal to prevent a classical trade war under full em-
ployment. The case for preventing a Keynesian trade war is more nuanced. When
demand is low and the global economy is in a liquidity trap, international coop-
eration should be used to avoid a tariff war, but not to prevent the use of export
subsidies. A tariff war is especially costly because tariffs act as an intertemporal
tax on consumption which further reduces demand and increases unemployment.
The welfare impact of a tariff war can be substantial, possibly doubling the unem-
ployment rate under plausible calibrations of the model. The uncoordinated use of
tariffs on imports can also give rise to self-fulfilling global liquidity traps as tariffs
lower the global natural rate of interest.
The outcome of a trade war is quite different if countries use subsidies on
exports instead of tariffs on imports. A transitory export subsidy stimulates con-
sumption in general equilibrium. In the Nash equilibrium with export subsidies,
full employment is achieved and there are no benefits from international coordina-
tion in the short run.
Third, using taxes on capital flows (or foreign exchange interventions) to raise
home employment is a zero-sum game that simply transfers welfare from the rest
of the world to the country imposing capital controls. Thus capital wars leave
welfare unchanged and there are no net gains from international cooperation.
The paper also considers the incentives of national policymakers to deviate
from free trade and impose tariffs assuming that a deviation may trigger a trade
war. Again, the incentives to deviate from free trade crucially depend on the state
of global demand. The incentives to deviate from free trade are little affected
by global demand if there is full employment. By contrast, national policymakers
have much stronger incentives to tax imports or subsidize exports in the Keynesian
regime with unemployment. Low global demand is conducive to trade wars
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Literature. There is a long line of literature on international monetary coordination—
see e.g. Engel (2016) for a review. The case for international monetary cooperation
in New Open Macro models was studied by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Benigno
and Benigno (2006), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2005) and among others. Ob-
stfeld and Rogoff (2002) concluded that the welfare gains from international co-
ordination of monetary policy were small. In a more recent contribution, Korinek
(2016) gives a set of conditions under which international policy spillovers are effi-
cient and international coordination is uncalled for. The model in this paper does
not satisfy Korinek’s conditions—in particular the fact that countries do not have
monopoly power.
Another group of papers has explored the international spillovers associated
with monetary policy when low natural rates of interest lead to insufficient global
demand and liquidity traps including Eggertsson et al. (2016), Caballero, Farhi and
Gourinchas (2015), Fujiwara et al. (2013), Devereux and Yetman (2014), Cook and
Devereux (2013), Acharya and Bengui (2018) and Bianchi and Coulibaly (2021).
Eggertsson et al. (2016) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2021) study the
international transmission of liquidity traps using a model that shares several fea-
tures with this paper, in particular the downward nominal stickiness a la Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2016). Those papers generally assume Taylor rules for monetary
policy and do not incorporate trade taxes to the analysis. Corsetti et al. (2019)
consider a partial equilibrium version of Eggertsson et al. (2016) and show that
reaching full employment through a currency depreciation may, under certain con-
ditions, decrease welfare. Fornaro and Romei (2019) present a model in which
macroprudential policy has a negative effect on global demand when the monetary
policy is at the zero lower bound. A more closely related contribution is Auray,
Devereux and Eyquem (2020). Auray, Devereux and Eyquem (2020) consider a
two-country model without financial markets, so that trade balances are always
equal to zero. These authors consider a smaller set of policy instruments than we
do (their model does not include export taxes, capital controls of foreign exchange
interventions) but look at the implications of fixed exchange rates, a topic that is
only briefly touched upon in this paper.
Other papers have explored whether the constraints on monetary policy re-
sulting from a fixed exchange rate or the zero lower bound can be circumvented
with fiscal instruments (Farhi, Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2014; Correia et al., 2013).
Farhi, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2014) show that value added and payroll taxes used
jointly with trade taxes can replicate the effects of nominal exchange rate devalua-
tions across a range of model specifications. Correia et al. (2013) study how fiscal
instruments can be used to achieve the same allocations as if there were no zero
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lower bound on the nominal interest rate in a closed economy. By contrast, the
model presented here assumes that the set of policy instruments is more limited.
The policy instruments considered in this paper are second-best and do not restore
the flexible-wage level of efficiency when the ZLB constraint is binding.
This paper is also related to the recent literature that looks at the macroe-
conomic impact of trade policy. Barbiero et al. (2019) study the macroeconomic
consequences of a border adjustment tax in the context of a dynamic general equi-
librium model with monetary policy conducted according to a conventional Taylor
rule. Lindé and Pescatori (2019) study the robustness of the Lerner symmetry
result in an open economy New Keynesian model and find that the macroeco-
nomic costs of a trade war can be substantial. Erceg, Prestipino and Raffo (2017)
and Barattieri, Cacciatore and Ghironi (2021) study the short-run macroeconomic
effects of trade policies in a dynamic New Keynesian open-economy framework.
Bénassy-Quéré, Bussière and Wibaux (2021) consider a model in which countries
are more likely to resort to tariffs at the ZLB. These papers look at small open
economies, whereas I focus on the international spillovers associated with monetary
and trade policies in a general equilibrium model of the global economy. Bergin
and Corsetti (2020) study the optimal monetary stabilization of tariff shocks using
a New Keynesian model enriched with elements from the trade literature.
The paper is also related to the literature that has quantified the welfare cost of
trade wars in general equilibrium (Ossa, 2014). In this type of framework, Amiti,
Redding and Weinstein (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) find that the welfare
cost of the 2018 trade war is moderate (less than 0.1 % of US GDP) but these
papers do not take into account the global demand effects that I focus on in this
paper.3
The presentation is structured as follows. The assumptions of the model are
presented in section 2. We analyze the optimal policies from a small open economy
perspective in section 3. The global equilibria are presented in sections 4 and 5 for
high and low global demand respectively. Section 6 analyzes the country incentives
to deviate from free trade. Section 7 presents dynamic extensions of the model.
3Freund et al. (2018) find a larger cost for the US-China trade war in a scenario where the
trade war depresses investment.
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2 Model
The model represents a world composed of a continuum of atomistic countries
indexed by j ∈ (0, 1) in infinite time t = 1, 2, ... The goods structure is similar to
Gali and Monacelli (2005). Each country produces its own good and has its own
currency. The nominal wage is rigid downwards as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2016). We introduce taxes on imports, exports and capital flows, which will be
the instruments of trade and capital account policies.4 There is no uncertainty.
Preferences. Country j is populated by a mass of identical infinitely-lived
consumers. The utility of the representative consumer can be written recursively,
Ujt = u (Cjt) + βjtUjt+1,






The time-varying discount factor will be used to model exogenous fluctuations in
country j’s demand.
The consumer consumes the good that is produced domestically (the home










(with αH + αF = 1) where CH is the consumption of home good, and CF is the
consumption of foreign good.










The elasticity of substitution between foreign goods is assumed to be larger than
one, εx > 1. The composite good defined by this index is the “global good”
imported by all countries.
4We do not introduce taxes or subsidies on labor, which can be used to ensure full employment
in this model.
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Budget constraints. The consumers can invest in internationally traded one-
period bonds denominated in the global good. The budget constraint for country





1 + τ bjt
) + PHjtCHjt + (1 + τmjt )PFjtCFjt = WjtLjt + Zjt + PFjtBjt, (3)
where PHjt is the home-currency price of the home good, PFjt is the domestic-
currency price of the global good before taxes, τmjt is a tax on imports, τ
b
jt is a
subsidy on capital outflows (or equivalently a tax on inflows), Rt is the gross real
interest rate in terms of the global good, Ljt is the quantity of labor supplied by
the consumer (at nominal wage Wjt), and Zjt is a lump-sum transfer from the
government. Home currency nominal bonds can be traded domestically but the
supply of these bonds is equal to zero in equilibrium and they have been omitted
from the budget constraint. A version of the model with money and nominal bonds
is presented in Appendix A.
Production and labor market. The home good is produced with a linear
production function that transforms one unit of labor into one unit of good, Y = L.
The representative consumer has a fixed labor endowment L and the quantity of
employed labor satisfies
Ljt ≤ L. (4)
There is full employment if this constraint is satisfied as an equality.
The wage inflation rate is πjt ≡ WjtWjt−1 − 1. The linearity in production implies
PHjt = Wjt so that πjt is the inflation rate in the price of the home good.
We assume that the nominal wage is sticky downward like in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2016) or Eggertsson et al. (2016). Downward nominal stickiness in the
wage is captured by the constraint,
πjt ≥ 0. (5)
The economy of country j can then be in two regimes: the classical regime with full
employment (Ljt = L), or the Keynesian regime with less than full employment
in which wage inflation is at its lower bound (Ljt < L and πjt = 0). This leads
to a L-shaped Phillips curve where inflation can be set at any non-negative level
πjt once there is full employment. The constraints on the labor market can be
summarized by (4), (5) and (
L− Ljt
)
πjt = 0. (6)
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Demand for home labor. The period-t demand for home labor is,









CFkdk denotes global gross imports and τ
x
jt is country j’s tax on
exports. The first term on the right-hand side of (7) is the labor used to serve
home demand for the home good and the second term is the labor used to produce
exports.
















jt are the tax-
distorted terms of trade that determine the demand for imports and exports re-
spectively.
Given the Cobb-Douglas specification (2), the home demand for the home good














)−αF Cjt + (Sxjt)−εx CWFt. (11)
The demand for home labor increases with home or global consumption but is




Balance of payments. Using Zjt = τ
m
jt PFjtCFjt + τ
x
jtPHjt (Ljt − CHjt) −
τ bjtPFjtBjt+1/
(
1 + τ bjt
)
, equations (7), and (10) to substitute out Zjt, Ljt, and




= Bjt +Xjt, (12)










The value of gross exports in terms of the global good decreases if the country
loses competitiveness in foreign markets (an increase in Sx) because the export
elasticity is larger than 1.
Equilibrium conditions. The first-order conditions are derived in Appendix
A. In Appendix A we assume that the consumers can invest in nominal government
bonds that yield a nominal interest rate ijt. Two equilibrium conditions will be










The left-hand side is the real interest rate in terms of country j’s home good. The
right-hand side is the real interest in terms of global good at home, Rt
(
1 + τ bjt
)
,
times the gross rate of depreciation of the home good relative to the global good.
This is an arbitrage relationship since there is no uncertainty.










The marginal utility from consuming one unit of home good in period t, on the
left-hand-side, is equal to the marginal utility from postponing that consumption
to period t+ 1.
3 National Policy-Making
This section takes the perspective of a small open economy. We consider the
problem of a national policymaker who tries to maximize domestic welfare taking
the global economic environment as given. The policymaker can use monetary
policy, trade policy, and capital account policy. The instrument of monetary policy
is the nominal interest rate, which is set subject to the zero-lower-bound (ZLB)
constraint ijt ≥ 0. The instruments of trade policy are the taxes on imports and
exports, τmjt and τ
x
jt, and the instrument of capital account policy is the tax on
capital inflows, τ bjt.
The home policymaker is free to set inflation at any level if there is full em-
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ployment.5 Inflation is not welfare relevant in this model,6 and we assume that it
is set to an inflation target π∗j > 0 if there is full employment. Inflation, thus, can
be written as the following function of employment,
πjt = π
∗
j if Ljt = L,
πjt = 0 if Ljt < L.
The equilibrium concept that we use in the rest of the paper is that of Markov
perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is a function of the state, which for
country j at time t is summarized by the country’s beginning-of-period foreign as-





denote the associated policy functions with tildes, C̃Hjt (Bjt), C̃Fjt (Bjt), L̃jt (Bjt),
X̃jt (Bjt), where the dependence on the global economic conditions is subsumed in
the time index. In each period t, the policymaker sets the domestic policy instru-
ments so as to maximize home welfare, taking his own future policy functions as
given. The policymaker cannot commit to future policies.
3.1 Instrument equivalence
The mapping between policies and allocations is not obvious because a given al-
location can be implemented with more than one policy mix. It will be easier to
characterize the equilibrium by looking for the optimal allocations rather than the
optimal policies. The next section characterizes the feasible allocations and the
policies that achieve them.
For a given state Bjt, a time-t allocation (CHjt, CFjt, Ljt, Xjt) is feasible if it can
be implemented with the policy instruments available to the policymaker, taking
the next-period policy functions C̃Hjt+1 (·), C̃Fjt+1 (·), L̃jt+1 (·), X̃jt+1 (·) as given.




CWFt to substitute out S
x






(Ljt − CHjt)1−1/εx − CFjt. (16)
5We assume that the policymaker sets inflation directly when there is full employment. As
explained in Appendix B, the inflation rate is endogenous to money supply in an extension of
the model with money in the utility function. We abstract from money supply in the baseline
model for simplicity.
6This is a feature of models with downward nominal wage stickiness such as Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2016). Inflation is not welfare relevant ex post but expected inflation constrains the
feasible allocations because of the ZLB constraint.
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Conversely, any allocation that satisfies this condition is feasible, implying the
following result.
Lemma 1 A time-t allocation (CHjt, CFjt, Ljt, Xjt) is feasible if and only if it
satisfies (16).
Proof. See Appendix E.
Note that we have not included the ZLB constraint in the definition of feasi-
bility. For the allocation to be consistent with the ZLB constraint, one needs to
check that the interest rate implementing the allocation satisfies ijt ≥ 0.
It is then possible to show that a feasible allocation can be implemented by more










. The equivalence between policy instruments
is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Lerner Symmetry) A feasible allocation (CHjtt , CFjt, Ljt, Xjt) that

































1 + τ bjt
)
. (18)
Proof. See Appendix E.
The equivalence between a tariff on imports and a tax on exports is known as
Lerner’s symmetry in the trade literature (Lerner, 1936).7 To put equations (17)
and (18) in words, the allocation is unchanged if the policymaker shifts the tax
from exports to imports and at the same time decreases the tax on capital inflows
by the same amount as the tax on exports. For the volume of gross exports to
stay the same, the decrease in the export tax must be offset by an increase in
the terms of trade. The real appreciation must in turn be offset by an equivalent
increase in the tariff on imports to keep the volume of imports the same. The real
appreciation results from a decrease in the tax on capital inflows of the same size
7Costinot and Werning (2019) provide a number of generalizations and qualifications of the
Lerner symmetry theorem in a dynamic environment.
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as the tax on exports. It cannot result from a higher interest rate because the
interest rate is pinned down by the Euler condition (15).8
Remark 1. A long-standing question in international macroeconomics is un-
der which conditions exchange rate manipulation can replicate the impact of tariffs
(Meade, 1955). This question resurfaced in recent policy debates as the US ad-
ministration justified the imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports by a claim that
China was manipulating its currency.
In the context of our model, a larger set of allocations can be achieved by trade
taxes under a fixed exchange rate than by a floating exchange rate without trade
taxes. On one hand, a fixed exchange rate does not prevent the policymaker from
spanning all the feasible allocations if she can use the trade and capital flow taxes.
On the other hand, not all the feasible allocations can be implemented by varying
the exchange rate when there are no trade taxes. Proposition 2 implies that the
allocations achievable with trade taxes τmt and τ
x
t can be replicated without trade
taxes if and only if
(1 + τmt ) (1 + τ
x
t ) = 1, (19)
that is, if the trade taxes generate the same relative price distortion in foreign
market as in the home market. An allocation achieved with trade taxes under a
fixed peg can be replicated with a floating exchange rate under free trade if and
only if this condition is satisfied.
Remark 2. The instrument of capital account policy could be foreign ex-
change interventions instead of a tax on capital flows. To show this, we consider in
Appendix B a variant of the model in which the capital account is closed, i.e., only
the home government can trade real bonds with foreign investors.9 The govern-
ment finances its purchases of foreign bonds by issuing domestic currency bonds to
home consumers, which can be interpreted as a sterilized foreign exchange inter-
vention. Appendix B shows that the real allocations that can be achieved in this
way are the same as when the government uses a tax on capital flows. A sterilized
purchase of foreign bonds is equivalent to a tax on capital inflows.
8The Lerner symmetry theorem may seem counterintuitive since a tax on exports reduces the
demand for the home good whereas a tax on imports increases it. Indeed, in the Keynesian regime,
a tax on exports and a tax on imports have opposite effects on home employment if the other
policy instruments are unchanged. Lerner symmetry, however, applies under the assumption of
a constant level of employment.
9The assumption that there are no private capital flows is extreme but the insights remain
true if frictions prevent economic agents from arbitraging the wedge between onshore and offshore
interest rates.
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3.2 Impact of policies in the Keynesian regime
In this section we consider the impact of changing the levels of the policy instru-
ments in the Keynesian regime with unemployment. One can see how policies
determine the allocation by looking at the equilibrium conditions (11), (13), (14)
and (15). Assume for simplicity that variables dated t + 1 are given. Then equa-
tion (14) shows how the interest rate ijt and the capital flow tax τ
b
jt determine the
terms of trade Sjt. Other things equal, an increase in the interest rate appreciates
the home currency in real terms, whereas an increase in the tax on inflows (or a
sterilized purchase of foreign bonds) has the opposite effect. The Euler equation
(15) shows how consumption Cjt is determined by S
m
jt and ijt. Other things equal,
increasing the tariff on imports lowers home consumption because the tariff acts as
an intertemporal tax on consumption. Raising the interest rate lowers consump-
tion. Finally, equations (11) and (13) determine Lt and Xt through channels that
are discussed below.
The model can be linerarized under the assumption that 1 − β is first-order
so that the impact of first-order changes in the countries net foreign assets have
a second-order impact on flow variables. Table 1 below reports the elasticity of






(see Appendix D for the derivations). The elasticities are computed in a sym-
metric allocation with zero trade taxes. The effects are decomposed between the
expenditure-changing channel, which affects the level of home consumption C, and
the expenditure-switching channel, which affects the allocation of home and foreign
consumption between the home and foreign goods.
An increase in the home interest rate reduces the demand for the home good
through both the expenditure-changing and the expenditure-switching channels.
For the tariff rate the two channels go in opposite directions. An increase in the
tariff rate reduces home consumption but at the same time shifts it toward the
home good. The net effect is to stimulate the home economy if and only if the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution εi is lower than the elasticity of substitution
between the two goods, which is 1 because of the Cobb-Douglas assumption. The
tax on exports has no impact on home demand but has an expenditure-switching
effect on foreign demand. Finally, the tax on capital flows, like the tariff on imports,
has expenditure-changing and -switching effects that go in opposite directions. The
tax depresses home consumption through an intertemporal effect but depreciates
14
the home currency, which shifts both home and foreign spending toward the home
good. If εi < 1 the tax on inflows has a positive net impact on home output.
Table 1. Elasticity of home output with respect to the policy
instruments in the Keynesian regime
policy instrument n i τm τx τ b
expenditure changing −α2Hεi −αHαF εi 0 −αHαF εi
expenditure switching −αHαF − αF εx αHαF −αF εx αHαF + αF εx
3.3 Optimal policies in the classical regime
We solve the policymaker’s problem in the particular case where the ZLB constraint
is not binding. In this case the only constraint on the time-t allocation is (16).
Using the balance-of-payments equation (12) the policymaker’s problem can be
written in Bellman form as,
Pjt












The solution has the following properties.
Proposition 3 In any period t in which the ZLB constraint is not binding the
national policymaker’s optimal allocation features full employment (Ljt = L) and









Proof. See Appendix E.
If feasible, full employment is always optimal. Full employment puts the econ-
omy in the classical regime. It is then optimal for the policymaker to use the trade
taxes to manipulate the home terms of trade like in the classical textbook tariff
war. The policymaker raises the home terms of trade by reducing the supply of
home good to the rest of the world, which can be achieved by taxing exports or
imports. The national policymaker can indifferently use the tax on exports or the
tariff on imports because of Lerner’s symmetry.
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4 Global Equilibria
This section defines the Nash (or non-cooperative) equilibrium between national
policymakers as well as the allocation chosen by a global policymaker who max-
imizes global welfare. We also characterize the equilibria in which the ZLB con-
straint is not binding.
A Nash equilibrium between national policymakers is a set of country alloca-
tions such that each policymaker maximizes home welfare given the global eco-
nomic conditions and the global economic conditions satisfy market clearing con-





t=1,...,+∞; (ii) net foreign asset paths (Bjt)j∈[0,1],t=1,...,+∞; (iii) na-
tional value and policy functions Vjt (·), C̃Hjt (·), C̃Fjt (·), L̃jt (·), X̃jt (·), and π̃jt (·)
for all countries j ∈ [0, 1] and times t = 1, 2, ... satisfying the following conditions:
• national optimization: the national value and policy functions and net foreign
asset paths solve problem Pjt subject to the ZLB constraint for all countries j
and times t;
• global market clearing: net foreign assets sum up to zero and the global
demand for imports is the sum of national demands for all times t,∫
Bjtdj = 0, (21)
CWFt =
∫
C̃Fjt (Bjt) dj. (22)
Some properties of the Nash equilibria are easy to derive at this stage of the
analysis. First, these equilibria inherit from Proposition 3 the property that in
any country where the ZLB constraint is not binding, there is full employment
and the policymakers set the trade taxes to manipulate the terms of trade as in




CWFt − CFjt over all countries j
and condition (22) implies ∫ (
Sxjt
)1−εx
dj = 1. (23)
Equation (23) reflects the fact that the terms of trade in export markets are relative
prices that cannot all move in the same direction.
We restrict the attention to the symmetric case where all countries have the
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same discount factor and initial net foreign assets, i.e.10
∀j, t βjt = βt, (24)
Bj1 = 0. (25)
The level of βt determines global demand in period t. A lower βt means higher
demand and we will sometimes refer to 1/βt as an index for global demand.
We will compare the Nash equilibrium with the equilibrium under a global
policymaker who sets the allocations in all countries so as to maximize utilitarian
global welfare V Wt =
∫
Vjtdj under the same constraints as national policymakers.
Like its national counterparts, the global policymaker cannot commit to future
policies. In the symmetric case, the global policymaker’s allocation Pareto domi-
nates the Nash allocation, and can be interpreted as the outcome of international
cooperation between the national policymakers.
The following proposition states a condition for the existence of a non-cooperative
equilibrium in which all countries are in the classical regime in all periods.
Proposition 4 (Equilibria with non-binding ZLB constraint) There is a non-
cooperative equilibrium in which the ZLB constraint never binds if and only if
βt ≤ 1 + π∗, (26)
in all periods t. The non-cooperative equilibrium is associated with a unique allo-
cation.
The non-cooperative allocation is implemented by trade taxes satisfying (20)
and nominal interest rates and capital flow taxes satisfying
1 + ijt =
1 + π∗
βt




in all countries and times.
The same allocation obtains in a non-cooperative equilibrium where the national
policymakers use only the tariff on imports or the tax on exports in addition to the
interest rate.
Proof. See Appendix E.
10The asymmetric case is interesting if one wants to study the international spillovers of demand
shocks. In this paper we focus on the spillovers from policy actions rather than on demand shocks.
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There exists a non-cooperative equilibrium in which countries always stay in the
classical regime with a non-binding ZLB if and only if condition (26) is satisfied.
This condition is familiar from the closed-economy literature on liquidity traps.
The ZLB constraint is not binding if and only if global demand is high enough
relative to the inflation target. In the non-cooperative equilibrium each national
policymaker attempts to manipulate the terms of trade in his country’s favor by
using the trade taxes.
The non-cooperative equilibrium leads to a unique allocation but the associated
policy instruments are indeterminate because of Lerner symmetry. The capital flow
taxes τ bjt are adjusted to offset the intertemporal distortions induced by the time
variation in the tariffs.
As a result of Lerner symmetry, the policymakers do not need to use all the
policy instruments to bring about the non-cooperative allocation. For example,
the same allocation is obtained if a tariff on imports is the only available policy
instrument on top of the interest rate. In this case, the tariff rate is uniquely
determined and equal to τm = 1/ (εx − 1) in all countries.
Like in the textbook tariff war, the Nash equilibrium is inefficient because it
leads to under-consumption of the global good. The global policymaker’s objective
is to maximize the level of global consumption that can be produced with the labor
endowment L, or equivalently to minimize the labor needed to produce any given
level of consumption. Using (9) and (10), the quantity of labor that is required to
produce one unit of consumption good in a symmetric equilibria is given by
` (Smt ) = αH (S
m
t )




where the terms of trade relevant for imports are
Smt =
1




It is is easy to see that ` (Smt ) is minimized for S
m
t = 1, that is if trade taxes do
not distort the allocation of consumption between the home and foreign goods.
Numerical illustration. The welfare loss from a tariff war under full em-
ployment can be substantial (see for example Ossa, 2014). In the rest of the paper
we will use the parameter values reported in Table 2 to illustrate the quantitative
properties of the model. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consump-
tion, εi, is set to 0.5, which corresponds to a risk aversion of 2, a standard value in
the literature. The elasticity of substitution between foreign goods, εx, is set to 3,
which is consistent with the estimates of Feenstra et al. (2018). Note in particular
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that the “microelasticity” between the differentiated imported goods is substan-
tially larger than the “macroelasticity” between the home good and imports, which
is equal to 1 in this model because of the Cobb-Douglas specification (2). A value
of 1 for the macroelasticity is also consistent with the evidence in Feenstra et al.
(2018). Finally, we assume αH = 0.6, i.e., home goods amount to 60 percent of
total consumption.
For these values the equilibrium tariff rate amounts to τm = 50% in the Nash
equilibrium and the welfare loss from a tariff war amounts to 1.89% of permanent
consumption.
Table 2. Baseline parameter values.
εi εx αH
0.5 3 0.6
5 Global Liquidity Traps
In this section we turn our attention to the equilibria in which the ZLB constraint
is binding, i.e., global liquidity traps. For simplicity, we consider liquidity traps
that last one period, and leave the analysis of dynamic liquidity traps for Section
7. We interpret period 1 as the short run and the following periods as the long
run. We assume that the global economy is in the full employment classical regime
from period 2 onwards, which is possible by Proposition 4 if
βt ≤ 1 + π∗ for t ≥ 2. (30)
We assume without loss of generality that the discount factor is constant from
period 2 onwards, i.e., βt = β2 for t ≥ 2. We do not restrict the value of β1.
We compare the equilibria under different assumptions about the policy in-
struments that countries can use. Since countries enjoy monetary sovereignty the
interest rate is always one of the available policy instruments but we consider dif-
ferent policy mixes for the other instruments. This reflects the fact that in the real
world not all countries use all the policy instruments all the time.11 For simplic-
ity we maintain the assumption of symmetry for the policy instruments, i.e., we
assume that all countries can use the same instruments.
11For example, the use of trade taxes and capital controls can be limited by membership to
international organizations such as the WTO, the EU, or the OECD.
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Before proceeding with the analysis of specific equilibria, we present some pre-
liminary considerations that will be useful across the board. In a non-cooperative
equilibrium the national policymaker for each country j maximizes period-1 home
welfare given by
Uj1 = u (Cj1) + β1V2 (R1Xj1) . (31)
Period-2 welfare is a function of the country’s net foreign assets Bj2 = R1Xj1. This
maximization problem is solved under the employment constraint Lj1 ≤ L and the
ZLB constraint ij1 ≥ 0. The results in this section are first-order approximations
derived under the assumptions that 1 − β2 is first order, so that changes in a
country’s period-2 net foreign assets have a second-order impact on the steady-state
flow variables. This allows us to derive closed-form expressions for the equilibrium
policies in period 1.
The cooperative equilibrium is derived by solving the global policymaker’s prob-
lem. The global policymaker takes into account that trade balances are equal to
zero in a symmetric allocation, so that period-2 welfare is given by V2 (0) inde-
pendently of period-1 policies. Hence maximizing period-1 welfare is equivalent to
maximizing period-1 global consumption. To see what this implies for the policy
instruments, we first note that in a symmetric allocation one must have Sxt = 1
and Smt is given by (29). It then follows from (15) for t = 1 that
CW1 =
[






Using (29), this expression shows that global consumption decreases with the total
period-1 trade distortion (1 + τm1 ) (1 + τ
x
1 ).
The two trade taxes τmt and τ
x
t have the same impact on global consumption
but the channels through which they affect global consumption are different. The
tariff on import is an intertemporal tax that reduces the consumption of the tariff-
imposing country. By contrast, the tax on exports affects global consumption
through the general equilibrium determination of the global good own rate of
interest. To see this more formally, observe that in a symmetric allocation the





1 + τ b1
) 1 + τx1
1 + τx2
, (33)
as a result of equation (14) with St = 1/ (1 + τ
x
t ). The global real rate of interest
increases with the ratio of period-1 to period-2 gross tax on exports. An increase
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in this ratio lowers the inflation rate in the global good between periods 1 and 2,
which given the nominal interest rate leads to an increase in the global good own
real rate of interest
Another implication of equation (32) is that global consumption and welfare
do not depend on the tax on capital flows τ b1 . As shown by (33), if all countries
increase their tax on capital inflows by the same amount, this is offset by an
equivalent decrease in the global real rate of interest.
The global social planner maximizes global consumption under the global em-
ployment constraint LW1 ≤ L and the ZLB constraint i1 ≥ 0. Let us write global
employment in period 1 as global consumption times the quantity of labor it takes
to produce one unit of consumption, that is, using (32) and CW2 = L/` (S
m
2 )















Trade taxes have an ambiguous impact on employment because they increase the
quantity of labor required to produce a unit of consumption at the same time as
they decrease consumption. Equation (34) shows that increasing the trade taxes
by the same amount in the short run and the long run has no impact on period 1
employment. Higher tariffs lower global consumption but more labor is required
to produce the same level of consumption and the two effects exactly cancel out.
Raising the trade taxes in period 1 and not in period 2 has an ambiguous impact
on employment. It is easy to see, by log differentiating (34), that employment
decreases with the tariff rate if and only if
Sm1 >
αH (1− εi)
αH + αF εi
, (35)
i.e., if the period-1 trade taxes are not too high.
With these considerations in mind, the analysis will proceed as follows. Section
5.1 considers the case of monetary wars where the only weapon is the nominal
interest rate (and possibly also the inflation targets). Section 5.2 adds tariffs
and Section 5.3 adds export taxes to the policy mix. Section 5.4 considers other
combinations of instruments and Section 5.5 summarizes the key takeaways from
this analysis.
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5.1 Monetary wars (i, π∗)
This section considers the case where countries use monetary policy only. The
equilibrium is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Conventional monetary war) Assume that the only policy instru-
ment available to national policymakers is the nominal interest rate. Then in the








There is a global liquidity trap with unemployment in period 1 if and only if β1 >
1 + π∗. There is no gain from international cooperation.
Proof. See Appendix E.
In the Keynesian regime with unemployment, a national policymaker raises
home consumption and production by lowering the interest rate. This raises home
welfare irrespective of the impact of the monetary stimulus on the trade balance.
The positive welfare impact of raising consumption and production dominates the
negative impact of depreciating the home currency from the perspective of terms
of trade manipulation.
It follows that in a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium, all the national
policymakers lower the interest rate until either there is full employment or the
ZLB constraint binds in all countries. It is the latter than happens in period 1 if
β1 > 1 +π
∗. In this case, using (32) with i1 = 0, L1 = C
W











The global economy is in a liquidity trap with the same level of employment in all
countries.
The global policymaker implements the same allocation as in the Nash equilib-
rium. As can be seen from (32), global welfare is maximized by setting the nominal
interest rate at the lowest possible level in all countries. This is true even when
a monetary stimulus has beggar-thy-neighbor effects, i.e., a decrease in ij1 raises
welfare in country j but lowers it in the rest of the world. A monetary stimulus
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(εx − αHεi − αF ) (36)
that is, if the expenditure-changing effect of a monetary stimulus (captured by εi)
is small enough relative the expenditure-switching effect of a currency depreciation
(captured by εx). This condition is satisfied by the parameter values in Table 1.
Irrespective of whether condition (36) is satisfied, a global monetary stimulus is
a positive-sum game because decreasing the interest rate everywhere raises em-
ployment and welfare in all countries, as it would in a closed economy (Bernanke,
2017).
The model can easily be extended to the case where national policymakers can
choose their inflation targets (an “inflation target war”). Let us assume that each
country j sets its inflation target π∗j in period 1. The Nash equilibrium from that
point onwards is then determined conditional on the inflation targets as before.
Each policymaker sets its inflation target so as to maximize domestic welfare taking
the other countries’ inflation targets as given. Then we have the following result.
Proposition 6 (Inflation target war) Assume that the national policymakers can
choose their inflation targets in period 1. Then in a symmetric Nash equilibrium





is full employment in all countries and all periods, and welfare is at the first-best
level. There is no gain from international cooperation.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Allowing countries to increase their inflation targets effectively allows them
to relax the ZLB constraint at no cost. There is no benefit from international
cooperation because the international spillovers associated with an increase in the
inflation target are the same as with a decrease in the nominal interest rate. An
inflation target war, thus, is a positive-sum game.
5.2 Tariff wars (i, τm)
We assume in this section that the national policymakers can use two instruments,
the nominal interest rate and a tariff on imports. From period 2 onwards the
12This condition is derived in Appendix D.
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economy is in the full employment equilibrium described in Proposition 4. As
indicated in Proposition 4, the Nash allocation remains the same if the set of
available policy instruments contains only i and τm. In this equilibrium the gross
tariff rate is set to




The Nash equilibrium in period 1 is more complicated to characterize and de-
pends on whether the ZLB constraint is binding or not. Our first result establishes
the equilibrium tariff rate in a Nash equilibrium with a binding ZLB constraint
and unemployment.
Proposition 7 Consider a Nash equilibrium in which all national policymakers
use tariffs on imports in addition to the nominal interest rate. If the ZLB constraint
is binding and there is less than full employment (L1 < L), the period-1 equilibrium
tariff on imports is given by






(1 + τm2 ) . (38)
The tariff rate is higher in the short run than in the long run if and only if εi < 1.
Proof. See Appendix E.
To understand the condition under which policymakers raise tariffs in period
1, consider a symmetric allocation in which there is unemployment and the tariff
rate is at the same level in the short run as in the long run. Then a national
policymaker finds it beneficial to increase the period-1 tariff rate if and only if
this increases home income in period 1 (the welfare cost of the intertemporal
consumption distortion being second order at the margin). The terms of trade are
not affected by the tariff in the Keynesian regime, hence home income is determined
by employment. As discussed in section 3.2, a tariff raises employment if and only




2 , the national policymaker raises τ
m
1 if and
only if εi < 1.
Increasing tariffs in all countries, however, has a deleterious impact from a
multilateral perspective because this decreases global demand, as one can see from
equation (32). A generalized increase in tariffs reduces welfare because the tariffs
act as an intertemporal tax on period-1 consumption.
To summarize, there are two distinct welfare costs of a tariff war to consider in
this model. In the long run, there is the distortionary cost of a “classical” tariff war
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in which all national policymakers attempt to manipulate their country’s terms of
trade under full employment. On top of this, there is the distortionary cost of a
“Keynesian” tariff war that lowers global demand if all countries raise their tariffs
because of unemployment in period 1.
A Keynesian tariff war reduces global consumption and welfare if εi < 1 but
has an ambiguous impact on employment. This is because, as explained at the
beginning of this section, a tariff increases the quantity of labor required to produce
each unit of consumption. A tariff war lowers employment if condition (35) is











This condition is satisfied for our baseline calibration.
The complete set of Nash equilibria is characterized in the following proposition
in the case where εi < 1 and (37) and (39) are satisfied.
Proposition 8 (Tariff war equilibria) Assume that εi < 1 and (37) and (39)
are satisfied. Then there is a threshold β∗ < 1 + π∗ such that the period-1 non-
cooperative equilibrium is of the following type:
(i) full employment, non-binding ZLB constraint and τm1 = τ
m
2 : this equilibrium
exists if and only if β1 ≤ 1 + π∗;
(ii) less than full employment, a binding ZLB constraint and τm1 given by (38):
this equilibrium exists if and only if β1 ≥ β∗;
(iii) full employment, a binding ZLB constraint and τm1 between τ
m
2 and the
level given by (38): this equilibrium exists if and only if β∗ < β1 < 1 + π
∗.
Proof. See Appendix E.
If β1 is larger than a threshold β
∗, there is a tariff war equilibrium with a
liquidity trap and unemployment. In this equilibrium each national policymakers
increases the tariff rate above the long-run level to raise home employment and
welfare, leading to the opposite outcome in general equilibrium. For our baseline
calibration and π∗ = 2%, the threshold β∗ is equal to 0.963, implying that the
tariff war equilibrium with unemployment arises for normal values of β1.
Another point made by the proposition is that there are multiple equilibria if
β1 is in the interval (β
∗, 1 + π∗). To illustrate, Figure 1 shows how the equilibrium
tariff rate varies with global demand 1/β1 for the parameter values in Table 1. The
figure reports the amount by which the period-1 tariff rate exceeds the long-run
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level, τm1 − τm2 . There are multiple equilibria, labeled A, B and C, when demand
takes intermediate values. Equilibrium A has the same tariff rate in period 1 as in
the long run, full employment and a non-binding ZLB constraint. This equilibrium
exists because β1 ≤ 1 + π∗, as already stated in Proposition 4. The other two
equilibria have higher levels of tariff and a binding ZLB constraint. The difference
between equilibria B and C is that C has less than full employment because of a
higher tariff level than in B. The equilibria are Pareto-ranked: welfare is higher
in equilibrium A than in B, and higher in B than in C.
Equilibrium multiplicity comes from a strategic complementarity between the
national policymakers’ actions. By raising home tariffs, the policymakers reduce
their demand for the other countries’ goods, leading those countries to lower their
interest rates. Higher tariffs, thus, push the global economy towards a liquidity
trap. Conversely, in a liquidity trap, each national policymaker finds it optimal
to increase tariffs above the long-run level to boost domestic employment. Higher
tariffs in one part of the world, thus, may lead to higher tariffs in the rest of the
world.13
The cooperative allocation significantly differs from the Nash equilibrium. First,
it follows from Proposition 4 that the cooperative allocation features zero tariffs
in the long run. In period 1 the global policymaker maximizes CW1 subject to the
ZLB constraint and the labor supply constraint. Given (32) and Sm2 = 1 these










1 ) ≤ L.
If β1 ≤ 1 + π∗, the global social planner maximizes consumption by minimizing
the production distortion, i.e., by setting Sm1 = 1. If β1 > 1 + π
∗, the global social
planner raises the consumption ceiling imposed by the ZLB constraint, which can
be done by increasing Sm1 above 1, i.e., by subsidizing imports in period 1. The
temporary import subsidy acts as an intertemporal subsidy on consumption. Home
welfare is maximized by setting Sm1 = Ŝ where Ŝ < 1 makes both the ZLB and













13A tariff war leads to higher tariffs because of the assumption εi < 1. If εi > 1 and there
is unemployment in period 1, national policymakers raise home welfare by lowering their tariff
rates below the long-run level, which increases global employment. It is possible to show that in
this case, the Nash equilibrium is unique.
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Hence, the tariff set by the global policymaker is either equal to zero (if β1 ≤
1 + π∗) or negative (if β1 > 1 + π
∗). In the latter case, the global policymaker
subsidizes imports to avoid unemployment in period 1. To illustrate, the optimal
tariff rate is shown with the red line on Figure 1. The difference between the
Nash equilibrium and the cooperative allocation is especially stark for low levels of
global demand. For β1 > 1+π
∗, a tariff war increases tariffs, whereas international
cooperation reduces them below the long-run level.
Our results about the cooperative policies and allocations are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 9 (Cooperative tariff policy) The global policymaker sets the tariff
to zero in the long run (τm2 = 0). In period 1, the global policymaker sets the tariff
to zero if β1 ≤ 1 + π∗ and to a negative level
τm1 = 1/Ŝ − 1 < 0, (41)
if β1 > 1 + π
∗, where Ŝ is the solution of (40) that is larger than 1. There is full
employment irrespective of the state of global demand.
Proof. See discussion above.
5.3 Trade wars with export subsidies (i, τx)
The outcome of a trade war is very different if it involves taxes on exports. It follows
from Proposition 4 that from period 2 onwards, there is a Nash equilibrium with
full employment and in which the national policymakers set the gross export tax
rate to




Like in the previous section we characterize the Nash equilibrium in period 1
conditional on (42). The equilibrium with export taxes is characterized in the
following result.
Proposition 10 (Trade war with export taxes) Assume that all national policy-







. Then the period-1 non-cooperative equilibrium is unique. If
β1 ≤ 1 + π∗, the ZLB constraint is non-binding and policymakers impose the same
export tax in the short run as in the long run, τx1 = τ
x
2 . If β1 > 1 + π
∗, the ZLB
constraint is binding and the export tax is lower in the short run than in the long
run, τx1 < τ
x
2 . There is full employment in both cases.
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Proof. See Appendix E.
With export taxes there is always full employment, even when the economy is in
a liquidity trap. Each policymaker can increase the home trade balance by lowering
the tax on exports. The tax on exports does not affect home consumption, so that
decreasing it unambiguously raises home welfare if there is unemployment. Hence,
all policymakers reduce the taxation on exports until there is full employment.
Full employment obtains in general equilibrium because reducing period-1 export
taxes reduces the global good own real rate of interest. as explained after equation
(33).
It is easy to see that with export taxes, the global policymaker’s allocation
is the same as in Proposition 9. This is because the variable that matters from
a global perspective is 1/Smt = (1 + τ
m
t ) (1 + τ
x
t ), so that the same allocations
can be implemented with tariffs on imports or taxes on exports. If there is a
liquidity trap, the global policymaker achieves full employment in period 1 by
setting (1 + τx1 ) = 1/Ŝ where Ŝ satisfies (40). In this case, τ
x
1 < 0, i.e., the global
policymaker subsidizes exports in period 1.
Observe that in a liquidity trap with export subsidies, international cooperation
is beneficial in the long run but is not necessary in the short run. If there is a
liquidity trap and the export tax rate is equal to zero in the long run, then the
period-1 Nash equilibrium leads to the same export subsidy τx1 = 1/Ŝ− 1 < 0 and
the same allocation as with international cooperation.
5.4 Other policy combinations
This section discusses combinations of policy instruments other than those ana-
lyzed in the previous three sections. We first discuss the case where policymakers
can use both trade taxes in addition to monetary policy. We then consider the
impact of adding the tax on capital flows to the policy mix.
Trade war with both trade taxes (i, τm, τx). The allocation with both
trade taxes is the same as when only the tax on exports is used. The equilibrium
inherits two key properties from Proposition 10: the non-cooperative allocation is
unique and features full employment. Full employment uniquely determines the
total trade distortion (1 + τm1 ) (1 + τ
x
1 ) and so the allocation.
Furthermore the levels of τm1 and τ
x
1 are also uniquely determined given τ
m
2
and τx2 . This is illustrated by Figure 2, which shows the variation with global
demand 1/β1 of the period-1 nominal interest rate and of the difference between
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period-1 and period-2 trade taxes.14 When global demand is high, the trade taxes
are set to the same levels in period 1 as in the long run, which is consistent with a
positive nominal interest rate. When demand 1/β1 falls below 1/ (1 + π
∗) the ZLB
constraint becomes binding and the national policymakers lose the interest rate as
an instrument. They subsidize exports to maintain full employment and increase
the tariff on imports to continue manipulating the terms of trade.
The analysis of the global social planner is the same as in the previous section.
The global social planner avoids distorting the economy in the long run by setting
(1 + τm2 ) (1 + τ
x
2 ) = 1 and ensures full employment in the short run by setting
(1 + τm1 ) (1 + τ
x
1 ) = 1/Ŝ. The global social planner does not gain anything from
being able to use two trade taxes instead of one.
Capital flow taxes. One can then add the capital inflow tax τ b to the mix
and consider the Nash equilibria where all the instruments are used. Allowing the
national policymakers to use the tax on capital flows leads to indeterminacy in the
policy instruments because of Lerner’s symmetry. Each policymaker can achieve
the desired allocation with an infinity of policy combinations featuring the same
wedge (1 + τmt ) (1 + τ
x
t ). One of these combinations involve a zero tax on capital
inflows so that the Nash allocation is the same as in the case where policymakers
do not use the tax on capital inflows.
Another case is where the policymakers use the tax on capital flows τ b but not
the trade taxes. Whether the Nash equilibrium results in a tax or a subsidy on
capital inflows depends on the state of global demand. If demand is high and the
ZLB constraint is not binding, each policymaker tries to improve the home terms of
trade by subsidizing capital inflows like in Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning (2014).
If demand is low and the ZLB constraint binds, each policymaker can raise home
employment by taxing capital inflows. Irrespective of the state of global demand,
the use of capital account policies does not change welfare or the allocation in a
symmetric equilibrium, since global consumption CW1 is not affected by τ
b
1 . Any
change in the global level of τ b1 is neutralized by an offseting change in the global
real rate R1. Capital wars are zero-sum games, as discussed by Korinek (2016).
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14The figure was constructed assuming τx2 = 0. The equilibrium is formally derived in appendix
E.
15It is not necessarily true, however, that the Nash equilibrium in capital controls is symmetric.
The welfare of a country is a convex function of τ b if the the export elasticity is above a threshold.
As a result, the Nash equilibrium may lead to an endogenous symmetry breakdown in which a
fraction of countries impose a higher tax on capital inflows than the rest of the world. We leave
a full-fledged analysis of this case for another paper.
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5.5 Conclusions
To conclude this section, Figure 3 shows the welfare impact of different kinds of
trade and currency wars under the benchmark calibration in Table 1. The discount
factor β1 is set at the level that implies an unemployment rate of 5 percent in
period 1 if national policymakers use only monetary policy. We assume that the
policymakers do not use the trade taxes in the long run (from period 2 onwards)
to measure the impact of short-run trade wars. The figure shows the impact
of the trade or currency wars on period-1 consumption in percentage points of
pre-war consumption. Each bar shows the impact on period-1 welfare of letting
the policymakers use the instruments reported above the bar instead of just the
nominal interest rate.
The main lesson from the figure is that the welfare impact of lack of inter-
national cooperation crucially depends on which policy instrument is used. The
worst welfare impact comes from an import tariff war because of the resulting de-
crease in global demand. A tariff war raises the unemployment rate from 5 percent
to 12.5 percent. By contrast, a trade war involving subsidies on exports leads to
full employment and raises welfare. It does not increase welfare to the first-best
level (which is achieved with an inflation target war) because of the consumption
distortion that results from the trade taxes.
Another lesson from this analysis is that a case for international cooperation
does not necessarily follow from the fact that a policy has beggar-thy-neighbor
effects. All the policy instruments in this model have beggar-thy-neighbor effects
if global demand is low,16 but international cooperation is warranted only in the
case of tariffs on imports.
6 Sustainability of Free Trade
This section looks into the conditions under which free trade can be sustained as
a trigger-strategy equilibrium. We assume that a deviation from free trade by one
country may lead to a permanent trade war between all countries. The risk of a
generalized trade war, thus, may deter individual countries from deviating from
16As shown in appendix D, tariffs are always beggar-thy-neighbor, and the policy changes
involving the other instruments (a currency depreciation achieved through a monetary stimulus
or a tax on capital inflows, or an export subsidy) are beggar-thy-neighbor under the baseline
calibration.
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free trade. We use this model to explore how the temptation to deviate from free
trade is affected by the state of global demand.
Like in the previous section we assume that the global economy is in a full
employment steady state from period 2 onwards and use β1 to vary the level of
global demand in period 1. We assume that a deviation from free trade by one
country in period 1 leads to a trade war starting in period 2 (that is, the Nash
equilibrium described in Proposition 4) with probability µ. A trade war starting
in period 2 continues forever.17 Which trade taxes are used in a trade war matters
only in period 1 and we assume that the national policymakers use tariffs on
imports.18
We look at the incentives for country j to deviate assuming that it is the only
one to do so. Free trade is sustainable if countries do not gain from a deviation. If
country j does not deviate from free trade, its period-1 welfare is the same as for






2 (0) where V
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is the period-2 welfare of a country with zero foreign assets if there is no trade
war. If country j deviates from free trade, its period-1 welfare is



















j1 are respectively the period-1 consumption and period-
2 foreign assets of country j if it deviates, and V T2 (·) is period-2 welfare if there is
a trade war.
The net welfare gain from deviating from free trade, ∆Vj1 = V
d
j1−V nj1, can thus





























The first term is the gain that country j derives from imposing a tariff in period
1 if this does not lead to a trade war. The second term, the cost of deviating
from free trade, is equal to the discounted expected welfare loss from a trade war
starting in period 2. Free trade is sustainable if and only if ∆Vj1 < 0.
17Alternatively we could assume that the trade war lasts a finite time and use the expected
duration of a trade war to vary its cost. However, the equilibrium is more complicated to derive
in that case. Assuming a permanent trade war keeps the analysis simple without affecting the
essence of the results.
18The results are similar if one assumes instead that the deviating country uses a tax or subsidy
on exports. Indeed, the temptation to deviate from free trade is even stronger in that case because
an export subsidy does not distort home consumption.
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The left-hand side panel of Figure 4 shows how the gain and cost of imposing
a tariff in period 1 vary with the state of global demand 1/β1. The figure was
constructed with the parameter values in Table 1 and assuming that a deviation
from free trade by one country triggers a generalized trade war with probability
µ = 3%.
The gain from a deviation from free trade is not greatly affected by global
demand when the economy is at full employment (i.e., when β1 ≤ 1 + π∗). This
is because in this case β1R1 = 1 so that a change in global demand is offset by a
change in the global real interest rate, which leaves the benefit of deviating from
free trade unchanged to a first-order of approximation. By contrast, the gains
from deviating from free trade become much larger when the global economy is in
a liquidity trap and any deviating country can raise its employment by imposing
a tariff. Free trade, thus, tends to become less sustainable when global demand is
low.
The right-hand side panel of Figure 4 shows the variation of the equilibrium
tariff rate, interest rate and trade balance for a deviating country. When global
demand is high, the deviating country imposes a tariff of about 27% to increase its
terms of trade. The period-1 equilibrium tariff rate is lower than in a generalized
trade war (where it is equal to 1/ (εx − 1) = 50% by equation (37)) because the
tariff, being temporary if it is not followed by a trade war, has a larger distortionary
effect on the deviating country’s consumption than in steady state. The deviating
country offsets the stimulative impact of the tariff on home demand for the home
good by raising its nominal interest rate. The deviating country thus falls in a
liquidity trap for a lower level of global demand than the rest of the world. When
it does fall in a liquidity trap, the deviating country raises the tariff rate to much
higher levels in order to preserve full employment at home. The tariff-imposing
country always increases its trade balance whether the global economy is in a
liquidity trap or not.
7 Dynamic Trade and Currency Wars
We generalize our analysis in this section by considering the case where a global
liquidity trap can last for several periods. We assume that the economy is a
steady state with full employment starting in a period, denoted by T , that can be
arbitrarily large. The Nash equilibrium is still defined as in section 4. The analysis
presented so far was about the special case T = 2. We generalize (30) by assuming
βt = βT ≤ 1 + π∗ for t ≥ T . (43)
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This ensures the existence of a steady state equilibrium with full employment after
period T .19
First, let us assume that the national policymakers can use only the nominal
interest rate as a policy instrument. Going through the same steps as in Section
5, it is easy to see that a global liquidity trap with unemployment arises in period
T −1 if and only if βT−1 > 1 +π∗. If the global economy is in a liquidity trap with
unemployment in all periods before period T , it follows from LWt = C
W
t , equation
(15) with it = 0, S
m
t = 1, and L
W
T = L, that the level of global employment in any













We have used the fact that inflation is equal to π∗ in period T and equal to 0 in
all periods before period T . It follows that there is unemployment in all periods
before time T if and only if
T−1∏
s=t
βs > 1 + π
∗, ∀t < T. (44)
We assume this condition to be satisfied in the following.
Second, let us assume that condition (44) being satisfied, the national policy-
makers can use trade taxes. In the long run (from period T onward), the national
policymakers attempt to manipulate the terms of trade and set the trade tax to
1/ (εx − 1). Like in the previous section, the outcome of a trade war before period
T is very different depending on whether the national policymakers tax imports
or exports. Consider first the case of tariffs on imports. The equilibrium in period
T − 1 can be constructed like in section 5.2 and τmT−1 is given by (38). In fact, it is
possible to show that the equilibrium tariff rate is given by (38) in all the periods
before time T (see Proposition 11).
If the national policymakers use tax on exports, they achieve full employment
by lowering the tax on exports before period T .
Our main results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Dynamic trade and currency wars) Assume that the economy
is in a global liquidity trap before period T if national policymakers use monetary
policy only. Then
19If βT > β
∗ where β∗ is the threshold defined in Proposition 8, there could also be a self-
fulfilling global liquidity trap in any period after time T . We rule out this type of multiplicity
here as it has been already analyzed in Section 5.2.
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(i) in the Nash equilibrium where policymakers use tariffs on imports only, the
equilibrium tariff τmt is given by (38) in all periods t < T ;
(ii) in the Nash equilibrium where policymakers use export taxes only, the pol-
icymakers tax exports at a lower rate before time T than after time T and there is
full employment.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The dynamics of a multi-period trade war are illustrated by Figure 5. To
construct this figure, we assumed that βt = 1.03 for four periods before decreasing
to its long-run level of 0.98 in period T = 5. The left-hand side panel compares
the dynamics of consumption under free trade, under a tariff war and when the
policymakers use export taxes. The right-hand side panel shows the variation of
the policy instruments over time.
Similarly, the global policymaker’s allocation can be solved for by generalizing
the analysis in sections 5.2 and 5.3. Iterating on (15) with ijt = 0 and , πjT = π
∗



















These expressions generalize (32) and (34). It remains true that the global pol-
icymaker maximizes welfare by setting the trade taxes to zero in the long run
(after time T ) and by subsidizing imports and/or exports so as to achieve full em-
ployment before time T . This implies that the global policymaker sets the trade
taxes such that (1 + τmt ) (1 + τ
x






We have analyzed a tractable model in which countries use monetary policy, trade
taxes and capital controls to maximize home welfare. When global demand is high
34
the trade taxes are used to manipulate the terms of trade like in a textbook tariff
war. When global demand is low and the ZLB constraint is binding, countries use
the trade taxes to raise home employment. The analysis suggests that there is one
case where uncoordinated policies lead to large welfare losses: when global demand
is low and countries use tariffs on imports. The uncoordinated use of all the other
instruments that we have looked at (interest rate, inflation target, export subsidy
and capital controls) is Pareto-improving or -neutral in the short run. However,
tariffs seem to be the instrument of choice in the real world. One interesting
question is why real world policymakers favor tariffs over other instruments such
as export subsidies. A possible explanation is that subsidies on exports may have
to be financed with distortionary taxation.
The paper opens several directions for further research. The assumptions about
price stickiness could be changed to look at the implications of local currency
pricing or dominant currency pricing.20 The structure of production could also be
enriched. In particular there could be international trade in production inputs and
not only in final consumption goods. Making the model less symmetric would allow
us to explore questions that have not been analyzed in this paper. For example,
assuming that countries differ in their time preferences would make it possible
to examine how a “savings glut” in one part of the world affects the benefits
of international policy coordination. Another relevant source of asymmetry is if
countries have access to different policy instruments.
20Egorov and Mukhin (2021) and Auray, Devereux and Eyquem (2020) discuss the benefits of
international policy coordination in an environment with dollar pricing.
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Figure 1: Variation of τm1 − τm2 with demand 1/β1: Nash equilibrium (black) and
cooperative equilibrium (red)
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Figure 3: Impact of trade and currency wars on period-1 consumption (percentage
points of pre-war consumption)
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Figure 4: Deviation from free trade. The l.h.s. panel shows the variation with
global demand of the gain and cost of deviating from imposing a tariff. The r.h.s.
panel shows the equilibrium tariff, interest rate and trade balance for a tariff-
imposing country.
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Figure 5: Consumption and policy instruments in a dynamic trade war
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. FIRST-ORDER CONDITIONS
This appendix derives the first-order conditions in the model augmented to
include money and nominal bonds. The consumer derives utility from real money
balances. We omit the country subscript j to alleviate the notations. The con-




































t Ct = PHtLt + Zt + PFtBt +B
n
t +Mt,
where P ct = (PHt)
αH [(1 + τmt )PFt]
αF is the consumption price index, Bnt is the
payoff on nominal bonds, Mt is the consumer’s money holding at the beginning of
period t, and v (·) is the utility from real money balances. The government supplies
zero nominal bonds and injects newly printed money through a lump-sum transfer




t PHt (Lt − CHt)−τ bt PFtBt+1/
(
1 + τ bt
)
+
Mt+1−Mt. Period-t money supply bears the time subscript t+ 1 to be consistent
with the notations for bonds.
The first-order conditions for Bt+1 and B
n
t+1 imply equation (14). The first-



























Then using (14) to substitute out Rt
(
1 + τ bt
)
from this equation, one can rewrite
the Euler equation as (15).
















APPENDIX B. ALTERNATIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS
This appendix studies the two alternative policy instruments mentioned in
section 3, money supply and foreign exchange interventions.
Money supply. We go back to the model with money in the utility function

















Nominal stickiness sets a lower bound on the nominal price of the home good,
PHt ≥ Wt−1.
Figure 6 shows how PHt and Lt vary with period-t money supply Mt+1, as-
suming that next-period variables are constant (a first-order approximation as
explained in Appendix D). The economy is in the Keynesian regime with unem-
ployment if money supply is lower than a threshold. In this regime, PHt is fixed
and an increase in money supply lowers the nominal interest rate by equation (49).
This depreciates the home currency and raises consumption and the demand for
home labor by equations (14), (15) and (11). When the demand for home labor
reaches L the economy transitions to the classical regime where further increases
in money supply raise the nominal wage and have no impact on real variables. The
policymaker sets inflation at the target level by choosing the appropriate level of
money supply, which corresponds to point A in Figure 6.
Observe however that it is not always possible to raise Lt to the full employment
level by increasing money supply. The nominal interest rate goes to zero as money
supply goes to infinity or reaches the satiation level. If the level of labor demand
corresponding to i = 0 is lower than labor supply L, the economy is in a liquidity
trap.
Foreign exchange interventions. We now assume that the capital account
is closed, i.e., the only home agent who can trade real bonds with foreign investors
is the government. The government finances its purchase of foreign bonds by
selling home currency bonds to the home consumers. This can be interpreted as
a sterilized foreign exchange interventions in which the central bank buys dollars.

















𝐴𝐴 (1 + 𝜋𝜋∗)𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−1 




t PFtCFt + τ
x







where the net supply of nominal bonds Bnt is no longer equal to zero. Using
the second expression to substitute out Zt in the first expression still gives the
balance-of-payments equation (12).
The real allocation can be derived from policies as follows. Because of (12), the
government determines the trade balance by setting the amount of reserves Bt+1.
The period-t + 1 allocation is also determined by Bt+1 through the next-period





(13), (15) and Sxt /S
m
t = (1 + τ
m
t ) (1 + τ
x
t ) is a system of three equations that can




t . One can then derive CHt and CFt using (9) and (10).




t and Lt results from (11).
Equation (14) no longer applies since the home consumer no longer arbitrages
between home currency bonds and foreign bonds. However the allocation is the
same as when the capital account was open and τ bt was set to the level satisfying
(14). The same allocations, thus, can be implemented with foreign exchange in-
terventions under a closed capital account or with a tax on capital flows under an
open capital account.
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APPENDIX C. STEADY STATES
This appendix analyzes the full employment steady states in which all countries
have the same level of trade taxes τm and τx and one atomistic country (denoted
by j) has a non-zero level of foreign assets. We denote with superscript W the
representative country in the rest of the world. We omit the time index since all
variables are constant over time.
In such steady states the tariff-adjusted terms of trade are given by
Sm =
1
(1 + τm) (1 + τx)
,
in all countries. We do not assume a particular value for Sm. The Nash equilibrium
is a special case with Sm = 1 − 1/εx and the global social planner allocation








Together with this equation, the resource constraint that home production is con-












As for country j, equation (11) with Lj = L and S
x
j = Sj (1 + τ
x) = Smj (1 + τ






)−αF Cj + CWF (SmjSm
)−εx
. (51)
Equation (12), together with βR = 1 and (13), implies
(1− β)Bj = αF
(
Smj
)αH Cj − CWF (SmjSm
)1−εx
, (52)
where CWF = αF (S
m)αH CW = αF (S
m)αH L/` (Sm). Equations (51) and (52)
determine Cj and S
m






W . Differentiating (51) and (52) with respect to Bj in Bj = 0 and using














= (1− β) αH
αF εxL
. (54)





Differentiating this equation with respect to Bj in Bj = 0 gives the marginal utility
of the country’s external wealth, or social marginal utility of external wealth
















Using (55) and (28) it is easy to see that the social marginal utility of external





only if Sm > 1 − 1/εx. The difference between the two marginal utilities comes
from the fact that individual consumers do not internalize the impact of external
wealth on the home terms of trade. In the Nash equilibrium with Sm = 1 − 1/εx
equation (55) becomes






APPENDIX D. ELASTICITIES AND SPILLOVERS
Elasticities. We derive the elasticities of macroeconomic variables with re-
spect to the policy instruments, which will be used to prove our main results in
Appendix E. We assume that the economy is in the full employment steady state
analyzed in appendix C from period 2 onwards so that π2 = π
∗.
We assume that 1 − β2 is small of the first order. If Bj2 is first-order, it then
follows from (53) and (54) that the impact of country j’s period-1 policies on Sj2
and Cj2 is second-order and can be omitted to a first order of approximation.



















where the period 2 variables S2, S
m
2 and C2 will be taken as invariant to the
period-1 policies of country j.
We denote by e(•, n) the elasticity of variable • = S,C, L,X with respect to
instrument n = i, τm, τx and τ b. The elasticities are defined as follows,






















Observe that the elasticities for labor and net exports are scaled by C and CF
respectively. The elasticities are computed in a symmetric allocation assuming
less than full employment. The elasticities are reported in Table D1.
Table D1. Elasticities in a symmetric allocation with unemployment
i τm τx τ b
S 1 0 0 −1
C −αHεi −αF εi 0 −αF εi
L − (αHεi + αF ) CHC − εx
CF
C
αF (1− εi) CHC −εx
CF
C
αF (1− εi) CHC + εx
CF
C
X − (εx − αHεi − αF ) αH + αF εi − (εx − 1) εx − αF (1− εi)
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The values of e (S, n) reported in the top two rows of Table D1 directly follows
from (57) and (58).
Differentiating (11) and (13) for t = 1 and using the fact that CWF1 = CF1,
Sx1 = 1 in a symmetric equilibrium, as well as (9) and (10) we obtain
e (L, n) = [e (C, n)− αF e (Sm, n)]
CH
C




e (X,n) = − [(εx − 1) e (Sx, n) + e (C, n) + αHe (Sm, n)] . (62)
The elasticities in the bottom two rows of the table are derived using (61) and (62)
and the expressions in the first two rows of Table D1.
The expressions reported in Table 1 in the main text can be derived using the
expressions for e (L, n) in Table D1 and the fact that CH/C = αH and CF/C = αF
in an equilibrium with zero trade taxes.
International spillovers. The international spillovers associated with the
different policies are measured as follows. We consider a symmetric allocation
with unemployment in period 1 and with zero trade or capital flow taxes in all




t = 0 for all t). We still assume that the economy is in a full
employment steady state from period 2 onwards. This implies Sm1 = S
m
2 = 1, CH =
αHC and CF = αFC. We then look at the impact of a small group of countries







their own welfare, Uj1, on the welfare of the rest of the world, U−j1, and on global
welfare,
UW1 = εUj1 + (1− ε)U−j1.
where Uj1 and U−j1 are given by (31).


























To derive the second line we used u′ (C1) = β1R1u









2 = 1 and substituted out V
′
2 (0) using (55) with S
m
2 = 1 and






computed with the equation above and the elasticites reported in Table D1. For







, η ≡ εx − αHεi − αF .
Note that η > 0 because εx > 1.














































' −εe (X,n) CF1
1 + n1
. (64)




















where we have used (15) with C−j2 = L for the first line, and S
m
−j1 = S−j1, (14)
with τ b−j1 = 0 and S−j2 = 1 to derive the second equality. This equation shows
that the policies of countries j affect consumption in the rest of the world only




























with Sj2 = S−j2 =
1 then gives




















= εe (R, n) , (66)
where





















Then substituting out the elasticities e (R, n) and e (X,n) using (67) and Table
D1 gives the expressions in the second line of Table D2. The third line is obtained
by summing the first two lines.








Uj −αHεi − γη −αF εi + γ (αH + αF εi) −γ (εx − 1) −αF εi + γ (η + εi)
U−j −αF εi + γη −γ (αH + αF εi) −αF εi + γ (εx − 1) αF εi − γ (η + εi)
UW −εi −αF εi −αF εi 0
Based on the expressions reported in Table D2 we can draw the following
conclusions on the impact of policy changes on home and foreign welfare in the
Keynesian regime.
A monetary stimulus (a decrease in ij) raises the country’s own welfare. Using
the expressions for γ and η one can shows that the elasticity of country j’s own
welfare with respect to ij is given by
−αHεi − γη = − (1− αF/εx) (αF εx + αH) < 0.
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A monetary stimulus is beggar-thy-neighbor (i.e., it decreases foreign welfare) if







(εx − αHεi − αF ) .
This condition is satisfied under our baseline calibration.








(αH + αF εi) .
This condition is necessarily satisfied if εi < 1 (that is, if a tariff increase raises
home employment), which is the case under our baseline calibration. Tariffs are
always beggar-thy-neighbor.
An export subsidy (a decrease in τxj ) always raises country j’s own welfare







(εx − 1) ,
which is true under our benchmark calibration.
An increase in the tax on capital inflows raises the country’s own welfare if and







(εx + αF εi − αF ) .
This is true under the baseline calibration. This is also the condition for this
policy to be beggar-thy-neighbor since the tax on capital flows does not affect
global welfare at the margin.
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APPENDIX E. PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. We need to show that if condition (16) is satisfied










and terms of trade Sjt that satisfy the
equilibrium conditions (9), (10), (11), (13), (14) and (15). To see this, use equations




CWFt to derive S
x
jt. The









Observing that the next-period variables are all determined as policy functions of
Bjt+1 = Rt (Bjt +Xjt), one can use equation (15) to derive ijt. The capital flow
tax τ bt is determined by (47). All the equilibrium conditions are satisfied, including
(13) because of (16).
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that a given allocation (CHjt, CFjt, Ljt, Xjt)






























. This implies (17). Equation (15) implies
that ijt = îjt. Let us denote by Ŝjt the value of the undistorted terms of trade






Then equation (14) and ijt = îjt implies (18).
Proof of Proposition 3. We omit the country and time index and denote
next-period variables with a prime to alleviate notations. The national policy-
maker’s problem can be written
V (B) = max
CH ,CF ,L,B′








































λ = βRV ′ (B′) .
The envelope condition is V ′ (B) = λ, which gives the national policymaker’s Euler
equation,
V ′ (B) = βRV ′ (B′) .
The first-order conditions for CF and L imply that λ and µ are strictly positive,
so that the constraint L ≤ L is binding. Using the first-order condition for CF to





















Since CF/CH = αF/αHS
m and Sx/Sm = (1 + τm) (1 + τx) this implies (20).
Proof of Proposition 4. Symmetry. A Nash equilibrium is necessarily
symmetric, i.e., all countries have the same allocation. To see this, observe first that
as all countries have the same discount rates, they have the same value functions,
Vjt (·) = Vkt (·). The Euler condition for the national policymaker’s problem,
V ′t (Bjt) = βtRtV
′
t+1 (Bjt+1), together with the assumption that all countries have
the same initial level of foreign assets Bj1 = 0, implies that all countries have the
same marginal utility of wealth, V ′t (Bjt) = V
′
t (Bkt) for all j k and t. This implies
Bjt = Bkt and by (21) that all countries have zero foreign assets in equilibrium.
Since Bjt is the only country-level state variable, all national policymakers face the
same optimization problem in any given period and choose the same allocation in
all periods.
Allocation. In a Nash equilibrium in which the national policymakers can
use all the policy instruments and the ZLB constraint never binds, it follows from
Proposition 3 that there is full employment in all countries and periods. As shown












It follows from (23) that Sxjt = 1. Equation (11) and CFt = C
W
Ft imply CHt+CFt =












The allocation is unique. Using that C and Sm = 1− 1/εx are constant, it follows
from (15) that 1+ it = (1 + π
∗) /βt. Hence condition (26) is necessary for the exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium in which the ZLB constraint never binds. Conversely,
condition (26) ensures that such an equilibrium exists.
The fact that C and CF are constant and the same for all countries implies that
all countries have the same constant marginal utility of wealth V
′
(0) = u′ (C) ∂C
∂CF
.
Then the national policymaker’s Euler equation V ′ (0) = βtRtV
′ (0) implies
βtRt = 1.
Instruments. Using the fact that C and Sm are constant and that inflation
is equal to the target, equations (15) and (47) and βtRt = 1 imply that ijt and τ
b
jt
satisfy (27). Any set of policies that satisfies (20) and (27) satisfies the conditions
of a Nash equilibrium.
By Lerner symmetry it is clear that the same Nash allocation obtains if the
national policymakers can use only one of the two trade taxes. To see this, consider
for example the case where policymakers use the tariff on imports and not the tax
on exports (the opposite case can be analyzed in the same way). Then by (20)
the tariff rate is constant and given by τm = 1/ (εx − 1). It then follows from (27)
that the tax on capital flows is equal to zero for all countries and in all periods.
This shows that if countries use only one trade tax they do not need to use the
tax on capital flows to implement the Nash allocation. The tax on capital flows is
useful only if there is time variation in the tariff rate, which cannot be the case if
countries use only one trade tax. Hence the Nash allocation remains the same if
countries uses only one trade tax in addition to the nominal interest rate, as stated
in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider a symmetric allocation with unemploy-







= −αHεi − γη < 0,
where the subscript W stands for the representative country.
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Hence a national policymakers raises home welfare by lowering the interest rate
as long as there is unemployment. The rest of the proof is stated in the text.
Proof of Proposition 6. The inflation target appears in equations (57)




. Hence increasing π∗j
given ij1 is equivalent to reducing ij1 given π
∗
j . As shown in the proof of Proposition
5, reducing ij1 raises home welfare if there is unemployment. Increasing π
∗
j has the
same effect. In a Nash equilibrium, all national policymakers raise their inflation
targets π∗j until there is full employment, i.e., all policymakers set an inflation
target such that β1 ≤ 1 + π∗j . The inflation target of country j is irrelevant for
welfare and so indeterminate as long as it satisfies this condition.
Proof of Proposition 7. We first write the first-order condition for the
national policymaker’s problem in the general case (this expression will be useful
for the proofs of the following propositions). We can write the Lagrangian for the
policymaker of country j
Lj1 = u (Cj1) + β1V2 (R1Xj1) + u
′ (CW1 ) [λ (L− Lj1)+ CW11 + i1µij1
]
,
where λ and µ are the costate variables for the labor constraint and the ZLB
constraint respectively. The costate variables have been scaled to simplify the
first-order condition.



























where 1n=i is the indicator variable equal to 1 iff the instrument is the nominal
interest rate. Assuming a symmetric allocation, we then use (56) to substitute out
V ′2 (0); equation (47) with [] and CF1 = αF (S
m
1 )
αH C1 to substitute out u
′ (C2);
and the definitions of the elasticities, to obtain




1 + τ b1
e (X,n)− λe (L, n) + µ1n=i = 0. (68)
In Proposition 7. we consider the case where the instruments are the nominal
interest rate ij1 and the tariff τ
m
j1 , and λ = 0 because there is unemployment.
Writing (68) for n = τm, τ b1 = 0, 1n=i = 0 and the elasticities from Table D1 gives
equation (38).
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Proof of Proposition 8. The fact that the equilibrium described in (i) exists
if and only if β1 ≤ 1 + π∗ is an implication of Proposition 4. As noted in that
Proposition, when policymakers can use i and τm there is a Nash equilibrium with
a non-binding ZLB constraint if and only if βt ≤ 1 + π∗.
By Proposition 7, the equilibrium described in (ii) exists if and only if there is
unemployment when the tariffs are set to (37) and (38) and the ZLB constraint is
binding. Using (34) this is true iff
β1 > β
∗
where the discount rate threshold is defined by










This proves part (ii) of the proposition.
Since it is impossible to have unemployment with a non-binding ZLB constraint,
the only other possible type of equilibrium must involve full employment and a
binding ZLB constraint, as described in (iii). To find the conditions under which















































































Figure 7 shows the r.h.s. and l.h.s. of this equation as functions of Sm1 /S
m
2 =
(1 + τm2 ) / (1 + τ
m
1 ) for µ = 0. (The figure was constructed with the parameter
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values in Table 1 but is representative of the case εi < 1.) An equilibrium where
the ZLB constraint is not binding (µ = 0) corresponds to the intersection of the
two curves (point B), which implies Sm1 /S
m




2 . There is full








so that λ > 0. The associated
nominal interest rate satisfies 1 + ii = (1 + π
∗) /β1, so that the ZLB constraint is
not binding if and only if β1 ≤ 1 + π∗. This is the equilibrium described in part
(i) of the Proposition.
The ZLB constraint binds (µ > 0) if and only if the l.h.s. of (71) is below the
r.h.s.. Figure 7 shows that this is the case iff Sm1 /S
m





an equilibrium with full employment and a binding ZLB constraint (λ > 0 and








2 < 1. By equation (34), full
























for β1 = β




strictly decreases with Sm1 when S
m









Hence, for any value of β1 such that β
∗ < β1 < 1 + π







and Sm2 that satisfies the equilibrium conditions of an
equilibrium with full employment and a binding ZLB constraint. This proves part
(iii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 10. As shown in Table D1, the policymaker of country j
can increase net exports Xj1 without changing consumption Cj1, and thus increase
home welfare, by lowering τxj1 in a symmetric allocation with unemployment. Hence
there cannot be unemployment in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Note that by (23) we have St = 1/ (1 + τ
x
t ). If β1 ≤ 1 + π∗, we know from
Proposition 4 that there is an equilibrium in which the ZLB constraint is not
binding in period 1 and τx1 = τ
x
2 = 1/ (εx − 1). To show that the equilibrium is


















Figure 7: Equation (71)












αH (αHεi + αF ) (1 + τ
x
1 ) + µ = αH (αHεi + αF ) . (73)
If the ZLB constraint is non-binding (µ = 0), solving for the tax on exports gives
τx1 = 1/ (εx − 1) = τx2 . In turn, equation (34) with Sm1 = Sm2 and LW1 = L shows
that the ZLB constraint is non-binding in this equilibrium if and only if β1 ≤ 1+π∗.
Thus, there exists an equilibrium with a non-binding ZLB constraint if and only
if β1 ≤ 1 + π∗ and in this equilibrium, the tax on exports is the same in the short
run as in the long run (τx1 = τ
x
2 ).
Condition (73) implies that the ZLB constraint is binding if and only if τx1 <
1/ (εx − 1), i.e., the export tax is lower in period 1 than in the long run, so that
S1 > S2. An equilibrium with a binding ZLB constraint exists if and only if there
exists S1 > S2 = 1−1/εx such that L1 = L when i1 = 0. Using (34) and observing
that ` (S1) (S1)
αF εi is increasing with S1 for S1 ≥ S2 (this is an implication of






), we can conclude that a Nash equilibrium with a
binding ZLB constraint exists if and only if β1 > 1 + π
∗. This achieves to prove
the proposition.
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Policy mix (i, τm, τx). We know from Proposition 4 that if β1 ≤ 1 + π∗,







2 and 1+i1 = (1 + π
∗) /β1. The uniqueness of this equilibrium
can be shown like in the proofs of the two previous Propositions, by writing the




1 , and showing that if the ZLB constraint is







If β1 > 1 + π
∗ the ZLB constraint must be binding in period 1. If it were not,
one would have 1 + i1 = (1 + π
∗) /β1, as just stated, whence a contradiction.
The equilibrium in the case β1 > 1 + π
∗ can be derived as follows. Consider a
Nash equilibrium in which the ZLB constraint is binding (µ > 0). By (34) there




)αF εi = ( β1
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αF εi . (74)




















This gives the value of τm1 , which is larger than τ
m
2 . Then
1 + τx1 =
1




gives the value of τx1 , which is smaller than τ
x
2 . Equation (74) implies that S
m
1





respectively increasing and decreasing with β1.
Proof of Proposition 11. We assume that the economy is in a global liquidity
trap before time T and that the policymakers can use tariffs. For any period t < T
the representative policymaker’s value function can be written,
Vt (Bt) = max
τmt ,it≥0
u (Ct) + βtVt+1 (Rt (Xt +Bt)) , (77)
where Ct and Xt are functions of the policy instruments and the state Bt defined
through the equilibrium conditions (11), (13), (14) and (15) assuming that next-
period variables are policy functions of the state Bt+1. The maximization is done
under constraint (4).
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The first-order condition for the policymaker’s problem (77) can be written (in
a symmetric equilibrium)






e (X, τm) = 0,
where the elasticities are given in Table D1. Using the expressions in that table to
substitute out the elasticities and CFt/Ct = αF (S
m
t )













The envelope condition does not apply to (77) since Ct and Xt are separately
defined as functions of the state Bt by the equilibrium conditions. However if 1−βt
is first order, the partial derivatives ∂Ct/∂Bt and ∂Xt/∂Bt are second-order and
can be neglected to a first order of approximation. Thus we have
V ′t (0) = βtRtV
′
t+1 (0) .
Iterating on this equation gives






V ′T (0) , (79)













V ′T (0) . (80)
Using the Euler equation (15) with it = 0 and Rt = 1/ (1 + πt+1) from (14) with










































This is the same as (38), obtained in the case T = 2. Hence the tariff rate is the
same as in Proposition 7.
Point (ii) can be proven like for Propositions 10. The policymakers can in-
crease the trade balance without distorting consumption by reducing τx as long as
there is unemployment, implying that there must be full employment in the Nash
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